Ronald Weber, Wilder Crane Professor of Government at the University of Wisconsin at Milwaukee, Editorial Board member of the Journal of Politics, and Executive Council officer at the Southern Political Science Association, critically assesses state legislative representation, which he claims is plagued by a nearly universal problem: legislative self-interest. Weber acknowledges that all persons in any situation are blinded by self-interest; "One of the pitfalls we all face...is becoming enamored of the subjects we study and thus being unwilling to criticize them" (609). This unintentional cold shoulder has developed a serious problem with legislative representation, Weber contends, because legislators are unwilling to admonish themselves, individually or collectively, for many reasons-the most serious of which, which are the focus of this study, all involve the inability of politicians to overcome their desire(s) for power, money, respect, or some other artificial benefit provided by their position as legislators.

Weber bases his study on problems he has identified during more than three decades of a career in political science devoted to the study of legislative representation (particularly with regard to state legislatures), and on various external literature. The purpose of Weber's analysis may not be only to highlight his ideas about what may be wrong with state legislative politics in America, but also to expand on and to provoke further analysis from others who have so long dedicated their efforts as political scientists to highlight and to solve the problems of legislative representation. Particularly, Weber's article begins "in the wake of [Alan] Rosenthal's [1998] work," The Decline of Representative Democracy: Process, Participation, and Power in State Legislatures. That particular work is regarded as one of the most comprehensive and best-organized guides for the understanding of state legislatures, but Weber is "disappointed that the book is light in terms of prescriptions for the future." Weber's goal, therefore, from the outset of this article is to expand particularly on Rosenthal's work, highlighting the problems of legislative representation in the states (particularly legislative self-interest) and hoping to lay the foundation for solving those problems.

Weber's concentration on legislative self-interest as the most significant problem with state legislatures is well defended: "that state legislatures make policy related to all these matters undermines public confidence in the institution and individual members and contributes to a growing frenzy in the mass media to highlight any alleged abuses of legislative life" (610). "All these matters" of which he speaks include, but are not limited to, the fact that legislators are responsible for drawing district lines in the very districts in which they serve, for writing the laws for their own retirement benefits plans (which are different from ordinary retirement plans since public funds-that pseudo-infinite supply of tax dollars-funds them), and for regulating their own behaviors and interactions in other arenas. Weber does not simply imply, and nor would I, that no legislature or legislator should be trusted any longer to act on these matters. He does imply, however, that "where the track record of performance" indicates that self-interest interferes with their benevolence or efficiency regarding particular matters, they should no longer be trusted to act on those matters without investiture in some reevaluation and further development of the checks and balances, particularly the checks, that involve state legislatures. Weber suggests in every example some form of cession of state legislative responsibility to neutral decision-making bodies.

Perhaps the most obvious starting point for discussing general problems with legislative representation is electoral politics. It is difficult to conceive an area of concern that could better illustrate problems, if there should be problems, with legislative representation than electoral regulations and patterns. One of the most obvious problems is that legislatures are responsible for legislative reapportionment and redistricting. A less-obvious problem is that marginal elections for state legislative positions have all but disappeared. A marginal election is one that is not uncontested (both major parties field at least one candidate) or otherwise a runaway election, or a competitive election.1 Weber inexplicably attempts no explanation for the near-disappearance of these marginal elections, but I suggest, without credible evidence, that a combination of lack of sense for civic duty, the idea that a state legislator is relatively insignificant, and/or the lack of knowledge of state government may be the culprit.

Perhaps a study of why challengers in state legislative elections are more likely to challenge someone who stands a chance of losing or who can not be beaten, as opposed to someone that is within reach but is not likely to lose, should be conducted. I would suggest that laziness plays a large factor there; major-party challengers of someone who can not lose is done for the experience, but they do not actually want the office, while challengers of someone who could lose do it because they actually want the office. Marginal elections have become rare, I would think, because challengers show up only for the experience or to be elected, not to waste time in an election that can not be won (if they actually want to win) or that could accidentally be won (if they want to lose). Also, a good example of why ignorance of state politics or of legislative politics may be the culprit: after the 1998 elections, the opinion was expressed and the idea became popular that, because the party division of state legislative seats on the whole was close, then the 1998 state legislative elections were the most competitive ever.2 The problem with that idea, though, is that a legislative body with 100 seats could be evenly split by fifty runaway elections going to each party; there would be nothing competitive about such an election, but there would be much competition within the chambers during the next legislative session.

Weber also acknowledges that the "one person, one vote" electoral doctrine has allowed for disproportional legislative representation (612), but I disagree with his analysis. Weber criticizes the "one person, one vote" system because certain persons (noncitizens, children, and convicted felons, for example) can not vote and therefore are not represented. His argument supports the ideal3 of equality, but it is not explained why such equality is best. The source of my disagreement is probably my interpretation that non-Americans should not be allowed to decide how America operates any more than Americans should be allowed to decide how the rest of the world operates; children should not be allowed that decision any more than they should be allowed to govern their parents; the bad apples of society should not be trusted to make that decision any more than an adulterer should be trusted implicitly in a (purportedly) monogamous relationship. If you are only invested in something to take advantage of it, if you lack sufficient knowledge or ability, or if you have proven that you can not be trusted, then you should have no rights to make those decisions. A better argument against the disproportionality of American electoral politics would be an attack on the single-member, winner-take-all districts, which include nearly all legislative districts in America. Minority parties throughout the country are subtly suppressed because their meager percentages of votes are not enough to garner any seats. To illustrate that point: If George W. Bush had won each state in the 2000 election by a 50% + 1 majority, while Al Gore had won each of his states by a runaway, Bush would still have won the Presidency but with as little as 22% of the vote. I am surprised and disappointed that Weber, who intends in this article to highlight the shortcomings of legislative representation in the United States, fails even to mention proportional representation.

Weber highlights another electoral problem, however, which I had never considered previously: the correlation between voter turnout and the disproportionate geographic concentration of voters based on race or ethnicity. Weber divided the states into three categories to analyze this problem: homogeneous states, or those whose ethnic or racial populations are generally integrated; heterogeneous states, or those who exhibit some racial or ethnic concentration; and Section 5 states, which qualify under Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act to allow "race and ethnicity [to] be taken into account in districting matters" (613). This time, I agree with Weber's reasoning behind the assertion that "state legislative districting plans do not provide effective equality in representation to voters" (615). Weber accuses (state) legislators of providing themselves with "safe" districts instead of focusing on the interests of their constituents or of the state or nation in general. While this may not be true in every case, I certainly agree with Weber that the temptation to prioritize protecting the job from competition more highly than actually doing the job well is something legislators should be without; legislators should no longer concern themselves with the reapportionment and redistricting, or regulations should be established and enforced that would render demographic concerns moot. (My idea is to enforce boundary lines that are parallel to imaginary geographic lines of latitude and longitude, except for state boundaries, and that all districts not on the border of the state should be rectangular in shape.)

One of the most easily noticeable concerns regarding lawmaking is its cost. Weber includes a table on page 619 of the article that compares the states by dividing legislative expenditures into two categories: per legislator and percent of total expenditures. A valuable addition to this table would be per capita expenditures. Excluding this figure unfairly presents heavily populated states (California, especially) as spending way too much money per legislator, when a state as populous as California would require a legislature far too large to be useful if its per-legislator expenditures were to be more comparable. The percentage of total expenditures offsets the unfairness of the per-legislator statistic, but not enough. Some states will spend a higher percentage on its legislature simply because its legislative needs are greater. For example, states that border Canada or Mexico or the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean require laws relating to the national border that landlocked states could never consider. There are countless other situations that require different or more numerous legislative needs from state to state that allows the percentage of total state expenditures statistic an unfair bias. Suffice it to say that each state in the union is different by design and should not be expected to spend the same amount. Also, it is disappointing to me that Weber qualifies exactly half of the states as spending too much simply because they spend more than the national average as a percentage of the state's total expenditures (616). It makes no difference which statistic he uses here; it is the idea that greater than the mean is excessive that disturbs me, for by implication that would mean that less than the mean is not enough. Obviously, there is no such thing as spending too little money if the job is getting done well, but to simply use the average is much too presumptuous, for many of the reasons I explained above (states are different; some require more legislative spending).4

State spending problems are not limited to legislative expenditures, but also include the many costs that are necessarily part of the campaign process.5 Campaign finance reform has been on the public agenda for decades, and session after session, most legislative bodies only pay it lip service before finding one reason or another not to pass any sweeping reform laws that they never intended to pass anyway. Being that they are the legislators, they have little if any incentive to want limits on campaign spending. More campaign money means more options, and more options generally allow for greater enjoyment.6 One point iterated and reiterated by Weber is that spending per legislative seat (legislative spending and campaign spending) is generally higher in "professionalized" legislatures than in citizen legislatures (619).7 However, there is no evidence to suggest that citizen legislatures are less efficient than professionalized legislatures, and thus no defense for the comparatively excessive spending by and for seats in professionalized legislatures. It is also universally unfortunate that challengers for state legislative seats usually lack the means to generate funding, for as they are not already elected, they generally do not have special interest groups in their pocket, so to speak, to contribute to their campaigns. Even worse, the gap between incumbent and challenger spending is increasing (621).

Meanwhile, previous studies show that, while campaign finance regulations have increased, the problem associated with campaign finance remains (which suggests to me that, as I have previously suggested, they only pay lip service to campaign finance reform; no real changes will be made, but laws will be passed to placate the voters). Regulation laws are also only meagerly enforced in several states due to underfunding of enforcement agencies. The underfunding of these agencies inhibits their ability not only to enforce regulations, but also to allow the media and public to learn anything significant about it. The combination of out-of-control campaign spending and underfunded campaign finance regulation leaves Weber "pretty pessimistic" about how campaign finance is handled in the states; add campaign finance regulation to the list of responsibilities that should no longer be the concern of the state legislatures.

Legislative and campaign spending in the states is not the only source of financial problems for state legislatures; also a problem are legislators' hiding their incomes, especially benefits, travel expenses, etc., from media and public view. The more that is hidden, Weber suggests, the more easily can legislators claim to be poorly paid. Legislators are also responsible in most states for writing the laws that govern their retirement plans. In their position, "it is easy to create a special retirement system...that permits [legislators] to retire with minimal service and little pay-in" (618), and the retirement system is only the best example-there are many other ways in which legislators control their own incomes. Still, while their retirement systems may seem to unfairly benefit legislators over other state employees, they can also serve as pseudo-term limits, persuading legislators to retire earlier than they otherwise would have in order to allow a fresh face, and thus fresh ideas, to take a shot at lawmaking. The exception to this rule is that many retirement plans also reward for tenure or for seniority. Either way, it is easy to criticize legislators of self-serving behavior when they can write the laws, which determine their own benefits.

"One of the stickiest issues facing state legislatures as they deal with ethics issues is the question of how strict to make financial disclosure laws" (623). Lawmakers are required to disclose information, but the amount of information and how detailed it must be varies from state to state. Some complain that legislators' privacy is being violated, and some suggest that strengthening disclosure laws will drive legislators or potential legislators away. On the other hand, I believe that legislators nearly everywhere get away with far too much far too easily. They have too much control over their own jobs and are allowed to take advantage of their financial situations at taxpayers' expense. Any lawmaker who would threaten to vacate his office (or any candidate who would threaten not to run) is ethically not capable of holding that office anyway. Unfortunately, again, it is very difficult to enact tough laws governing unethical conduct of state legislators when they are the ones making the laws. Most attempts are as futile as trying to force the truth when we are unaware of a lie: the solution will only come about only when they want it to. One way around this is by employment of the initiative or referendum (or even recall), but even where such methods are constitutionally available to the citizens of a given state, various setbacks (lack of understanding of the issue or of legalese, or lack of concern) constrain the ability to enforce ethically correct behavior.

In every example of a problem briefly explained in this report, Weber highlights legislative self-interest as the primary source of the problem and the most important problem of state legislative representation that should be confronted. After decades of study, Weber has grown impatient with the conservative, incrementalist approach and is pushing for sweeping reform across the board, or at least a push in that direction (625). Weber's article is not exactly groundbreaking; he only draws his own conclusions from many scholars' previous research, and furthermore, he occasionally contradicts himself or ignores important information or tools that should have been addressed (proportional representation, per capita legislative expenditures, etc.). But his article is not meant to be all encompassing, but only to scratch the surface. At the least, his report provides for those interested links to the greater reference works on which much of the article is based. The key difference between those greater works and Weber's article, though, is that they purport to inform greatly, while Weber's article intends to incite change, and cite the greater works as references should they be necessary for further understanding. He explains the problems and his reasons just well enough to justify his solutions, which will necessarily be expanded upon if public confidence in (or even awareness of the activities of) state legislatures is to be restored. If his enthusiasm catches on, his work (or others' work that he analyzed) could catalyze a reform movement.

Weber, Ronald. 1999. "The Quality of State Legislative Representation: A Critical Assessment." The Journal of Politics 61 (No. 3, August): 609-627.