After reading Robert Kaplan's The Coming Anarchy, I have a few thoughts on the war on Iraq. But first, about the author of this eerily intuitive, Machiavellian work of geopolitical philosophy and recent history: Robert D. Kaplan is neither a historian nor a philosopher, but a reporter who has spent nearly thirty years in the field traveling throughout the Third World, witnessing first hand the recent atrocities of humanity. Rather than interpret the facts based on the ignorant peacetime intellect of today's America, Kaplan has found himself reading great works of political philosophy and fiction to supplement his empirical and theoretical knowledge of that about which he writes. In other words, Kaplan ensures that he not only knows what he is talking about, but that he can back it up thoroughly and unequivocally.

That said, let's get to the "eerily intuitive" part. Most of the essays in The Coming Anarchy were written in 1997 and 1998, though the title essay (which constitutes about one third of the book) was written in 1994, and perhaps the most important of the essays (only sixteen pages) was written in 1999 specifically for this book. In that last, most important essay, Kaplan writes,

There is much new weaponry that now, because of postindustrial miniaturization, is concealable even as it is more deadly: the perfect tools for stateless terrorists of which the world has enough. The clock ticks toward something unpleasant... (183)

Little more than a year later, four massive passenger jets were used as weapons and smashed into the World Trade Center towers, the Pentagon, and, thanks to the heroic efforts of passengers onboard, an open field in Pennsylvania. His intuitions are not restricted to terrorist attacks, however. Indeed, The Coming Anarchy is even more applicable to current geopolitical tensions precisely because it could not directly consider them.

Kaplan's insights throughout this book are lucidly expressed and defended; his geopolitical pessimism is justified. Having said that, it is short of exciting to share that Kaplan expects the demise of Western civilization as we know it (though gradual), beginning perhaps with the collapse of the international system. You can guess toward where he points his finger, even years before America's renewed interest in disarming Iraq: turmoil in the Middle East -- further, as a result of Western intervention. But, what may surprise you is that Kaplan is not frightened of Western "imperialist" action to control the Middle East -- indeed, he tacitly promotes it. Rather, he is worried that our irrational but deep respect for political borders, rather than cultural ones, is what is leading to the inevitable collapse, the Coming Anarchy.

The events of September 11, 2001, envisioned abstractly by Robert Kaplan however pessimistically, served as the long overdue wake-up call that notable statesman such as -- surprise, we don't know these names, because we have for so long ignored them in favor of irrational geopolitical idealism -- have for too long been trying to get through. The "fundamental causes" of terror, Kaplan notes, quoting from Joseph Conrad's Nostromo: A Tale of the Seaboard, are "the same as ever, rooted in the political immaturity of the people" (161) -- including, I would argue, both the terrorists and the terrorized. This immaturity is precisely what prevents the legitimate authorities from preserving order. Idealism is the tragic flaw of otherwise great leaders who allow notions of peace, defined as the absence of war, and convenience to dominate society.

The difficulty of handling our current geopolitical situation with Iraq stems from two problems: first, that we must rely on consensus of an international organization notorious for its naïve and intense idealism; second, that we are attempting to morally justify this war. Regarding the former, Kaplan says, "Consensus can be the handmaiden of evil, since the ability to confront evil means the willingness to act boldly and ruthlessly and without consensus" (178). An executive, national leader such as the President of the United States can much more easily deal with the despotic regime in Iraq than can, say, the United Nations Security Council, which relies on the hesitant consensus of a rough representation of the rest of the world. Further,

Because international goals are best realized through national self-interest, the President of the United States should project power through the United Nations to the benefit of both. The US should pay its dues and, in essence, without declaring it, take over the UN in order to make it a transparent multiplier of American and Western power. Such an action would fill the world organization's insipid ideological vacuum with at least someone's values -- indeed, ours; the UN has always been most credible when it was an accomplice of US foreign policy goals. (181)

"There is an inherent philosophical danger in... prevent[ing] or postpon[ing] war even when war is necessary to fight evil" (178). It simply sets a bad example. Attempting to moralize a war is also a ridiculous notion; no war can be moral because there is no justification for murder -- all religious interpretation that suggests otherwise contradicts the very foundation and purpose of religion. The law, like religion, is founded (in principle, at least) on morality, attempting to provide and protect the best system for preserving life and the values of a given society or culture. The ultimate paradox, though, is that "morality can not be achieved without amoral force" -- simply put, a world without corruption, infidelity, stupidity, or even the occasional war would be a world without mankind. Not only are such things necessary evidence of humanity, but systems that allow such things to occur, whether autocratic or democratic, are the only morally justified systems of governance.

This brings me to the topic of democratizing Iraq, or for that matter any nation. Kaplan is very particular about what [typically] is required for democracy to succeed: a long history.

Democracy neither forms states nor strengthens them initially... Social stability results from the establishment of a middle class. Not democracies but authoritarian systems, including monarchies, create middle classes -- which, having achieved a certain size and self-confidence, revolt against the very dictators who generated their prosperity.

Further, statehood also requires history, but less political and more cultural. Where maps rely on and wars are fought over political boundaries that are essentially meaningless to the uneducated cultures that occupy various Third World regions, cultural or national boundaries, not those declared by geopolitical bodies like the United Nations, are what should determine states. Today in the Middle East and Western Africa, and throughout history (notably in Europe), such political boundaries have been and continue to be the wrong causes for costly wars. In a civilized world that places such value on the ideal of sovereignty and self-determinism, something is wrong with the West's control of how boundaries are established in foreign lands.

Or is it? Where the Third World can be improved more quickly with the guidance and support of the First World, even if that requires Third World subservience, then isn't the effort (at the very least) justified? True, serving Western interests in the developing world reflects, especially in the eyes of the indigenous inhabitants, the ingenuity of the West and Western corporations "that alone have the organizational and technical know-how to make it all happen" (163). This can easily breed resentment and hostility for the invaders who have come to steal the natives' wealth, but is it not also true that the natives, even if not raised to be equals to the foreigners, are raised to a better position as a result of our presence? Can it not be assumed as well that, with our presence, they are better off than if left isolated? But, if left isolated, they would have little or no knowledge of us, nor us of them, and we would have therefore no concern for them and no compulsion to act on their behalf at all.

The simple fact of the matter is that these developing areas of the world contain valuable resources that can help the rest of the world, but resting undeveloped can do little to help the locals. Moral? Perhaps not. But reasonable? You bet. Everyone gains from it, even if the gains are disproportionate.

So the questions come to Iraq. Is Saddam Hussein evil? Probably. Is a war to depose Saddam Hussein and his regime justified? Certainly. Is such a war morally justified? Probably not. I have tried all along to avoid suggesting that we have a moral obligation to depose Saddam Hussein and simply to serve our interests, though as a matter of fact, we should simply do it for our interests, and indeed we will (as we always have, as all nations always have). Our pursuit and any nation's pursuit of international approval is in our interests to a point, but lack of such approval does not deny us our locally perceived obligation to do what the international community refuses to do in order to preserve a higher quality of collective international security.

The United Nations has stalled and will probably not support this war. But the war will be fought nonetheless, for the betterment of all. This is really what is going to happen, and when it comes down to it, even our most hesitant allies are likely to get involved, if only to ensure that their interests are at least partially served.

In the end, hopefully, everyone gains. The United States will certainly gain, as it proves that the United Nations -- the only international coalition of all free nations in the world, indeed hosted in New York City -- can do little more than watch over the President's shoulder. The United Nations will gain either way; disagreement is a natural and healthy part of human interaction, and no one disagrees that something must be done.

Ultimately, it seems to me, the primary US goal in this instance is to preserve the reputation of the United Nations even at the expense of America's favorability abroad. The United States is saying what the United Nations refuses to say: the resolutions of the Security Council will be enforced, whether by the entire world or by us alone, when it is in our national interests to have them enforced. Divided as world opinion may be, there is little doubt in my mind that the United States is doing the United Nations a favor, and taking one for the team in the process.

Also available in Microsoft Word (DOC) format: 20030308-Kaplan.doc

For more on Robert Kaplan, see his Atlantic Monthly essay archive, including six of those included in his book, The Coming Anarchy. Also see his selecton of books on Amazon.com. (Keep in mind that this is Robert D. Kaplan, the journalist and geopolitics writer, not Robert S. Kaplan, the microeconomics and business writer.)

Kaplan's most recent book, Warrior Politics: Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos, is next on my reading list.